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Caste-Based Exclusion in Nepal's
Communal Micro-Hydro Plants
(With Specific Reference to Ghandruk)
Discriminatory practices rooted in an ethno-caste system have dominated
Nepal for centuries. This paper investigates the existence of such practices
in Nepal's communal micro-hydro plants. A field research on the role of
caste in influencing access to electricity was carried out in Ghandruk,
Nepal. The research indicates that although the costs of establishing the
micro-hydro plant is shared equally between user-groups, benefit sharing
is highly uneven. This analysis demonstrates the need for development
projects to be more aligned with socio-economic ground realities.

I.

INTRODUCTION
1.1 Energy Resources in Nepal
No significant deposits of fossil fuel are available in Nepal. Hence, it relies

heavily on traditional energy sources. The most dominant energy resource in the country
is biomass. Forest resources are under increasing threat due to the excessive dependence
on fuel wood, fodder, timber, and other forest products. It is estimated that about 44,000
hectares of forest area is degraded and deforested every year, while only about 4,000
hectares are reforested (CRTN, 2005). In the meanwhile, the mountainous landscape and
high surface runoff found across the country means that it has great potential for
hydropower generation. It is estimated that there is potential for 83,000 MW (MegaWatts), of which about half is economically exploitable (Warnock, 1989). Large-scale
hydroelectric installations have been constructed to tap this potential. According to the
Nepal Electrification Authority, the total installed hydroelectricity generation capacity
was 586 MW in 2002. By the same year, this power had been made available to 878,100
2
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consumers through 1,982 Km (Kilometers) of transmission and distribution lines (CRTN,
2005).
Unfortunately, all the electricity distributed is largely consumed in urban centers
and lowland areas. Due to the rugged and unstable topography of the country, the
national grid that produces more than 95% of the total hydroelectricity generated is
unlikely to connect itself to the rural parts of the country in the near future. One of the
responses to this problem has been the development of local micro-hydro plants that
electrify rural communities in remote and inaccessible areas of Nepal. A brief definition
of a micro-hydro is that it produces 5-100 kW (Kilo-Watts) of electricity to satisfy needs
on a village level. According to Fullford, Mosley, and Gill (2000), electrification through
Micro Hydro for rural communities is a boon as it has 'proved very successful as a tool to
help (them) develop their economic position and improve their life-style' without getting
connected to the grid.

In the past, a combination of public sector credit through the Agricultural
Development Bank of Nepal, private sector initiative, and technical and financial
assistance through various agencies has enabled communities in remote areas of Nepal to
own and use electricity through micro hydro plants. One important point to be noted is
that a lot of these plants are owned and operated communally. Smith (1994) identifies
communal involvement as one of the ‘key factors for the success of village hydroElectric programmes’ as he explains that ‘when a (communal) contribution, in terms of
cash and/or labor is required, the villages will carefully consider whether the hydroelectric scheme is worth the investment’. Based on the experience of the Aga Khan Rural
Support Programme who has installed 15 schemes in Northern Pakistan, he states that the
schemes with an element of community involvement are the ones that are most reliable
and fully utilized (Smith, 1994). Commenting on rural electrification through microhydro in Nepal, Fullford, Mosley, and Gill (2000) emphasize the role and importance of
communal involvement by stating,

'The installation of a hydroelectric generation system often involves a
whole community so that the community needs to be mobilized. This
3
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involves setting up management systems, so that people can be held
responsible for running the system. Usually a hydroelectric scheme is
subsidized from outside, but the local people contribute labor for the civil
works that need to be done'.

1.2 Caste and Ethnicity in Nepal
Discriminatory practices based on an ethno-caste hierarchy latently exist across
Nepal today. The feudalists of Nepal that ruled the country for the past two and half
centuries interlinked the legal system with the Hindu caste system. Consequently, the
Nepalese society is highly stratified along the lines of caste and ethnicity with priestly
Brahmans at the top, the Kshatriya (kings and warriors) just beneath them, and the
Dalits, who are designated as 'impure', and 'untouchable' or acchut at the bottom (GSEA,
2005).
The lack of laws regarding caste-based discrimination is not an issue as such
practices were officially abolished in 1963. In fact, Nepal's new constitution of 1990
describes Nepal as 'multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and democratic'. Furthermore, it declares
that all citizens are 'equal irrespective of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe, or ideology'.
Unfortunately, the enforcement of these laws is lax. In addition, discriminatory
provisions still exist, such as the protection of 'traditional practices', which has been used
to bar Dalits from temples and to permit continued caste discrimination. Consequently,
caste-based discrimination, while diluted, remains today.

The caste hierarchy of Nepal plays a strong role in determining who does and
does not gain access to political and economic power and resources. Information on the
incidence of poverty by caste in Nepal demonstrates how the caste system influences the
ability of different groups in gaining power and resources. According to it, the Dalits that
are at the bottom of the hierarchy had the highest incidence of poverty in both 1995 and
2003. Similarly, the Brahman and Chettri that are on top had one of the lowest incidences
of poverty for both years (GSEA, 2005).

4
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1.3 Objectives of the Study
Having briefly discussed the role of caste in gaining access to power and
resources in Nepal, this study seeks to examine the role of caste in determining a
household's access to electricity and the ways in which caste can determine access to
electricity in rural Nepal.

2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 Site Selection
In 2005, it was believed that 1,100 micro hydro plants existed in Nepal (CRTN,
2005). Consequently, in order to assess the existence, causes and implications of castebased exclusion of micro hydro in rural Nepal, this study focused only on the ‘Ghandruk
Micro Hydro Plant’. Specifically, the study focused on the status of the Dalits living in
the village in regards to their access to electricity generated from the plant. The plant is
located in ward number five of Ghandruk Village Development Committee in Kaski
district of Western Nepal. The nearest road to the plant is at about 6 hours walking
distance at a place called Nayapul which is 43 km from Pokhara (Khennas S., & Barnett,
A., 2000).

The project started in November 1990 and was completed in 1992. It

generates 50kW of electricity. The total project cost is USD 59,9162.

The Ghandruk Micro Hydro Plant is considered to be one of the oldest and most
successful communal Micro Hydro in Nepal. The local people provided labor worth USD
3,504 during the initial stage of building the plant. Apart from that, the Canadian fund
provided USD 13,743, ACAP (Annapurna Conservation Area Project) provided USD
9,162 and the Agriculture Development Bank of Nepal provided a loan of USD 13,743 of
which the Nepal government subsidized half. Most of the equipment needed for the

2

All conversions from Nepalese Rupees to US Dollars in this paper are approximated and based on the
exchange rates of July 19, 2007 as announced by the Nepal Rashitriya Bank.
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project was designed and installed by Development and Consulting Service, a Nepali
Non Government Organization. A British-based charity, ITDG (Intermediate Technology
Development Group), now known as Practical Actions, which has a long experience in
micro-hydro, provided technical support. The plant is managed by the communal
Ghandruk electrification management committee.

In 2001, the village had a total population of 4,448 or 1,013 households. The
village has a heterogeneous population with Gurungs being predominant. They constitute
62 percent of the total population, followed by Dalits (22 percent), Magars (six percent),
Brahmins (five percent) and Chettris (five percent) (Interdisciplinary Consultants, 2001).
Only, six wards in the village, however, are electrified from the plant: wards 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
and 8.

As described previously, the Dalits are the poorest and most excluded caste group
in rural Nepal today. Consequently, in this study, the Ghandruk Micro Hydro Plant and
the Dalits were taken as representatives for communal Micro Hydro and excluded groups
in rural Nepal.

2.2 Questionnaire Development

The questionnaire was developed based on the objectives of the study. Thus, its
first goal was to retrieve data on factors that might help determine if caste influences a
household’s access to electricity from the Ghandruk Micro Hydro Plant. These factors
were: the number of members per household, level of educational attainment of
household heads, annual income per household, and the distance of a household from the
micro hydro plant.

To assess how belonging to an excluded group might limit one from accessing
electricity, questions related to the following issues were developed: financial condition,
the initial distribution process, and the evolution of the use of electricity of respective
households.
6
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Finally, in order to assess the possible implications of caste-based exclusion to
micro hydro plant and Nepal, questions regarding how the locals perceived the ‘existent’
unequal distribution of electricity in the village were developed. Since the village had
recently undergone an insurgency, the political environment in the village was suspected
to be volatile. Hence, direct questions regarding inequality and discrimination were not
developed.

2.3 Data Collection

41 households were interviewed during the course of the research. For the field
interviews, the sample was to be stratified along the lines of age, caste, gender, location,
lodge ownership, and distribution of electricity in order to make it representative of the
population of the electrified community in the village. No efforts were made towards
including households from the none-electrified community in the remaining three wards.
In addition, only the households that contributed labor when the plant was established in
1991 were interviewed.

Before starting field work, a focus group discussion and a pilot test were carried
out in the village. The focus group comprised of five locals. The pilot test was conducted
with a local Dalit. During the fieldwork, relevant documents were also collected of which
the most important ones were: the current subscription list, the latest survey of additional
demand for electricity in the village, and the costs and revenues balance sheet of the
micro hydro plant for the past three years.

Apart from local villagers, experts on micro hydro were also interviewed in
Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Ghandruk respectively. In Kathmandu, interviews were
conducted with the executive officer for NTNC (National Trust for Nature Conservation)
and the Team Leader for Practical Action, Nepal. In Pokhara, interviews were conducted
with the current director of ACAP and a micro hydro specialist at ACAP. In Ghandruk,
interviews were conducted with one of the two operators of the Ghandruk Micro Hydro, a
7
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member of the local electricity management committee, the chairman of the local
electricity management committee and the manager of the Ghandruk micro hydro plant.

3. ANALYSIS
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
3.1.1

Data Collected

In this section, quantitative data collected during field work, which are the most
pertinent, are discussed. As seen in Table 1 below, the average WATTS, or amount of
electricity individual households subscribed to at the time of the field research, is 235
Watts. MEMBER is the number of members in each household. As suggested by the
table, the size of an average household in the village is three. Similarly, the average
INCOME, total annual income of households converted in US Dollars, is USD 745.
EDUCATION is the years spent in school by the head of the interviewed household. The
total years spent in school by an average household head in the village is three years.
Finally, DISTANCE, is the total time in minutes it takes for an individual to walk from
their house to the plant. Compared to other options, i.e. measuring the distance in meters,
this approach was chosen because most villagers talked about distance in terms of
minutes (on foot) and not meters. In addition, this was also more convenient for data
collection.
Table 1:
Summary Statistics for Variables
WATTS MEMBERS INCOME EDUCATION DISTANCE
Mean

235

3

745

3

14

Median

100

3

550

0

15

Maximum

1400

6

3668

10

25

Minimum

25

1

0

0

5

Std. Dev

310

2

936

4

5

In the electrified community of the village, the micro hydro provides electricity to
a combination of 284 Gurung, Dalit, and other castes. Out of the 284, 216 (78 percent)
8
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are Gurung, 53 (19 percent) are Dalits, and nine (three percent) are of other caste. At the
start, the tariff was set at a flat rate of USD .0076 per watt for ordinary households and of
USD.0115 per watt for lodges. Later, beginning April 14, 2007, the village electrification
management committee revised its policies and tariffs were set at a flat rate of USD.0122
per watt for ordinary households and at USD.0158 per watt for everyone using electricity
for commercial purposes. Households are fitted with low cost circuit breakers. Power is
automatically cut off when consumers use more than the wattage allocated.

The average monthly revenue generated by the plant calculated for the past two
and a half year based on the original tariff policy charging USD .0076 per watt for
ordinary households and USD.0115 per watt for lodges is USD 436. Average monthly
revenue generated by the plant for the past three months after it imposed its revised tariff
policy charging a flat rate of USD.0122 per watt for ordinary households and at
USD.0158 per watt for everyone using electricity for commercial purposes is USD 578.
As seen in Table 2 below, the average monthly revenue and cost of the plant for the past
32 months has been approximately USD 457 and USD 284.

Table 2:
Descriptive Statistics for Monthly Revenues and Costs of the Plant (2004-2007)
Revenue (USD)

Cost (USD)

Mean

457

284

Median

440

293

Standard Deviation

60

95

Minimum

403

161

Maximum

667

482

Count (Months)

32

32

Source: Field Study, 2007

In 2006, the electrification management committee decided to replace many of its
old equipment in the plant, i.e. nozzles, LC Board, runner, etc. It cost them about USD
8,398. In addition, in 2007, the committee decided to buy new police switches worth
9
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USD 2,443. According to residents, these are the only major operation and maintenance
costs incurred for the plant ever since it established in 1991. Currently, the committee has
around USD 2,290 in a bank called the Dwitiya Sanstha (Secondary Institution) in
Pokhara, Nepal. Several parts will require changing in the immediate future, i.e. the
generator that might not work for more than an additional 5 years. If replaced, it will cost
the villagers about USD 7,635.

The plant is managed by the Ghandruk Electrification Management Committee.
Initially, the plan was for the committee to consist of eleven executive members: six
nominated from each of the wards where the scheme provides service, three nominated
from Ghandruk Yuwa Samuha (Ghandruk Youth Club), one nominated from among the
ACAP officials, and the Ghandruk VDC chairperson as an ex-officio member. However,
after the Maoist insurgency, no 'official' electricity management committee exists in
Ghandruk as all the original and elected committee members have been chased out by the
rebels. The committee has appointed three staff – one manager and two operators – to
manage and operate the system. Each receives approximately USD 61 as a monthly
salary.

3.1.2

Stratified Sample

As previously mentioned, an effort was made towards making the sample
representative of the population based on age, caste, gender, location, lodge ownership,
and distribution of electricity. Consequently, the variation in the samples collected
suggests that some success has been achieved in doing so.

As seen in figure 1, the population of the electrified community is constituted by
22 lodges, 53 Dalit households, and 209 other households. In the meanwhile, the sample
is constituted by five lodges, nine Dalit households, and 27 others. Consequently, the
percentage of lodges (12%) and Dalit households (20%) in the sample is very close to the
percentage of lodges (8%) and Dalit households (19%) in the population of the electrified
community.
10
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Figure 1:
Comparing the representation of Dalits and Lodges in the Sample and Population

Source: Field Survey, 2007

Similarly, as seen in figure 2, success has also been achieved in making the
distribution of electricity in the sample representative of that in the population. In figure
5, the x and y axes represent the households and the Watts of electricity they are
subscribed to. The households in both the sample and population in the figure have been
arranged in ascending order (based on Watts subscribed) from left to right. As can be
seen, the curves of distribution of electricity for both the sample and population are
almost identical.
Figure 2:
Comparing the Distribution of Electricity in the Sample and Population

Source: Field Survey, 2007

11
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An effort was also made towards making the sample representative of the wards
and women in the village. In regards the wards, success was achieved as out of the 41
households, 14, 10, 5, 1, 5, and 6 were from wards 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 respectively. In
addition, 10 out of the 41 interviewees were women. Interviewing more women was
difficult considering that household heads in Ghandruk were predominantly male.
Finally, some success was gained in including as much elder people in the sample. The
logic behind trying to do so was that they were most likely to know about the MHP since
its installation in 1991. The mean age for the 41 interviewees was 57 years, with the
oldest interviewee being 83 years old and the youngest being 27 years old (See Table 3
below).

Table 3:
Descriptive Statistics for AGE in the sample
AGE
Mean

57

Median

59

Minimum

27

Maximum

83

Count

41

Source: Field Survey, 2007

3.2 Distribution
3.2.1

Regression Analysis

In order to investigate if caste plays a role in determining a household’s access to
electricity, a cross-section regression analysis in OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) was run
based on data collected from 41 households in Ghandruk. The regression model used in
order to do so is as follows,

WATTS = β0+β1MEMBERS+β2EDUCATION+β3LODGE+β4INCOME
+β5CASTE+Β6DISTANCE

12
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Descriptions of the variables used in the model can be seen in Table 4 below,

Table 4:
Describing the Variables
VARIABLES

DESCRIPTION

WATTS

Subscribed Electricity per household

INCOME

Annual income per households (in USD)

LODGE

Dummy Variable: Lodges - 1 and Others - 0

EDUCATION

Years spent in school per household head

MEMBERS

No. of members per household

DISTANCE

Minutes taken to walk to the MHP

CASTE

Dummy Variable: Dalits-1 and Others – 0

The first independent variable is MEMBERS. Since, the more members, the higher
demand for electricity in a household and vice versa, it is hypothesized that MEMBERS
should positively correlate with WATTS. The second independent variable in the model is
EDUCATION. Since one would expect that with more education, a household would be
aware of the benefits of electricity and want more electricity, it is hypothesized to have a
positive relation with WATTS. The third independent variable used in the model is
LODGE. Since the lodge owners are the local elites, it is hypothesized that lodges will
have access to more electricity compared to ordinary households. The fourth variable
used is INCOME. Since, a higher income means that a household is capable of paying for
more electricity compared to others; it is expected it to have a positive relation with
WATTS. The fifth variable in the model is CASTE. Since, the Dalit are a marginalized
group, they are expected to have access to significantly less WATTS compared to other
castes. Finally, the last independent variable is DISTANCE. The further a household is
from the plant, the more expensive it is to provide electricity to it and vice versa. Hence,
it is expected to have a negative relationship with WATTS.

13
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Table 5:
Cross-Section Growth Regressions

Dependent Variable: WATTS
Method: Ordinary Least Squares
Included observation: 41

VARIABLES

COEFFICIENT

T-STAT

MEMBERS

19.22

1.06

0.29

2.17

0.03

8.11

0

-0.27

0.7

-1.76

0.08

-0.51

0.60

PROB.

(18.1)
INCOME

0.06**
(0.03)

LODGE

696.73***
(85.81)

EDUCATION

-2.08
(7.43)

CASTE

-121.49*
(68.87)

DISTANCE

-2.93
(5.65)

OBSERVATIONS

41

R-SQUARED

0.81

ADJUSTED R-SQUARED

0.78

OBS*R-SQUARED

19.32

As can be seen in the OLS estimations of the regression in Table 5, the significant
variables are INCOME, WEALTH, and CASTE. All other variables correlate
14
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insignificantly to WATTS. The coefficient for INCOME is .06. This means that a USD 1
increase in annual income is associated with an increase of subscribed WATTS of .06. The
coefficient for LODGE is 696.73. This means that an average LODGE has access to
significantly more Watts than an ordinary household. Finally, the coefficient for CASTE
is -121.49. This indicates that, a Dalit household in Ghandruk compared to households
belonging to other caste groups subscribes significantly less electricity. Clearly, the
regression analysis indicates that caste-based exclusion from access to electricity does
exist in Ghandruk.

In order to see if there was a problem with imperfect multicollinearity, A the
correlation matrix between the independent variables was constructed and investigated to
make sure none of them had very high correlations (see Table 6 below). In addition,
comparing the observed R-Squared with critical values in the chi-square table, the null
that there is heteroskedascticity in the model can be rejected.

Table 6:
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
INCOME LODGE EDUCATION MEMBERS DISTANCE CASTE
INCOME

1

0.52

0.13

-0.07

-0.01

-0.32

LODGE

0.52

1

-0.01

-0.06

0.25

-0.18

EDUCATION

0.13

-0.01

1

0.44

-0.401

-0.13

MEMBERS

-0.07

-0.06

0.44

1

-0.11

0.36

DISTANCE

-0.01

0.25

-0.4

-0.11

1

0.11

CASTE

-0.32

-0.18

-0.13

0.36

0.11

1

3.2.2

Further Evidence

As we see in Figure 3 below, out of the 283 electrified households, 216 belong to
the Gurung, 53 belong to the Dalits, and nine belong to other caste groups. Consequently,
the Gurung households that make 78% of the population have access to 42,745 Watts or
92% of electricity while the Dalits that make for 19% of the population have access to
15
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2,410 Watts or 5% of electricity. The others that make for 3% of the population have
access to 1,575 Watts or 3% of the electricity.

Figure 3:
Distribution of Population and Electricity across Caste-Groups

Source: Field Survey, 2007

In addition, while a household belonging to a Gurung or 'other' caste group, on
average, have access to 198 and 175 Watts respectively, a Dalit household, on average
has access to 46 Watts of electricity (for more details see Table 7 below).

Table 7:
Descriptive Statistics: Access to Electricity of Different Ethnic Groups
GURUNG

DALITS

OTHERS

Mean

198

46

175

Minimum

25

20

25

Maximum

1400

100

350

Sum

42745

2410

1575

Count

216

53

9

Source: Field Survey, 2007
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Given the fact that the labor contributions from the village were equally
distributed between the households, the argument goes that benefit sharing should be
equal too and the Dalits that make for 19% of the population should gain access to 19%
of the electricity generated. One way in which the inherent inequality in distribution
could be justified is if the Dalits were not to demand for additional electricity. However,
this is not the case as we see in Figure 4. The total addition demand of the Dalits for
electricity is 28.175 kW at an average of 370.36 Watts per household, almost as much as
per household demand of the Gurung households which is 383.16 Watts. Similarly, per
household demand of the Dalits is more than that of those belonging to other castes
(150.69 Watts) and the village itself (329.10 Watts).

Figure 4:
Additional Electricity Demanded in 2007

Source: Field Survey, 2007

3.3 Determinants of Exclusion
3.3.1

Financial Status

In the regression analysis, it was observed that both LODGE and INCOME were
significantly related to WATTS. Lodge owners are the local elites in the village. As
suggested by figure 1, the Dalits are the poorest caste-group in Nepal. In addition, they
17
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have the lowest annual income in the electrified community of the village at USD 138 per
year per household compared to USD 2,084 and USD 687 per year per household for
lodge owners and others (households that are neither Dalits nor lodges). These
calculations are based on data collected from the sample of 41 households. Clearly,
financial status does play a large role in determining who does and who does not gain
access to electricity. Consequently, the poverty of the Dalits can be put down as one of
the reasons why they have access to negligible amount of electricity. Nevertheless,
looking at the large demand for additional electricity made by the Dalits (28.175 kW) and
the extremely low tariff rates at which electricity is available in Ghandruk, there seem to
be other factors too that might have contributed to the unequal distribution.

3.3.2

Social Status

The distribution pattern that was set in 1991 (Phase I and II), is not set in stone.
Throughout the past 15 years or so, local households have been trading their electricity
with one another with out any interference of the local electrification management
committee. In the electrified community of Ghandruk, households are free to buy and sell
electricity from one another. Consequently, it is possible for a household that had a
certain Watts of electricity in 1991 to have more electricity today. It can buy or even rent
electricity from a neighbor or relative. Similarly, new households established in the
village after the distribution of electricity in 1991 can have access to electricity through
the same process. The interviewed experts made it clear that all the electricity generated
from the plant is distributed and the electrification management committee can no longer
provide additional electricity to anyone. Nevertheless, due to trading of electricity among
villagers, the distribution pattern is always changing.

As seen in figure 5 below, out of the five lodges that were included in the sample,
two stated that their subscribed wattage had remained the same while three expressed that
they had increased their subscribed wattage over the years. Similarly, out of the eight
Dalit households, six had experienced no change while the subscribed wattage of two had
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actually decreased. Finally, for the group that fell in neither category, 19 had experienced
no change while nine had increased their access to electricity.

Figure 5:
Changes in Access to Electricity

Source: Field Survey, 2007

Similarly, in 1999, 16 lodges had subscribed to a total of 17 kW of electricity at a
rate of 1.06 kW per lodge. At that time, the lodges had subscribed to 33% of the total
electricity generated from the MHP (Thumim, 1999). In 2007, however, 22 lodges are
subscribed to a total of 18.25 kW of electricity at a rate of 829.4 Watts per lodge. Today,
the lodges have subscribed to 38% of the total electricity generated from the plant. In a
sense, the access to electricity of lodge owners over the years has increased by
approximately 15%.

Clearly, the scenario presented does not look good for an excluded group like the
Dalits. When locals in a community like Ghandruk constantly trade electricity with one
another, marginalized groups like the Dalit have the most difficulty in acquiring more
electricity due to their social status. Apart from financial incentives, locals selling or
renting electricity are bound to have a social incentive to do business with a household
that belongs to one's own caste group or one that can be considered an equal. Hence,
social status is another fact that affects distribution.
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3.3.3

Lack of Awareness

Finally, one another factor apart from wealth, and status that explains the highly
uneven distribution of electricity in Ghandruk is the way in which electricity distribution
took place in 1991. The distribution of electricity in 1991 took place in two phases. In
the first phase, the management committee went to households and asked them how
much electricity they wanted. Consequently, at the time, there was a demand of only
33.775 kW. This was problematic to the committee and the villagers as selling only
33.775 kW would not generate the needed revenue. Consequently, the committee and
villagers together persuaded the lodge-owners to purchase the surplus electricity.

Table 8 below compares the distribution of electricity in 1991 after the first
phase when only 33.775 kW were distributed with the current subscription of electricity
in Ghandruk. The standard deviation and mean for 1991 are 180.58 and 141.31
respectively. The coefficient of variation for 1991 is thus 1.28. This implies that
distribution of electricity after the first phase itself was highly uneven. However, the
standard deviation and mean for 2007 are 239.52 and 171.05 respectively. This means
that the coefficient of variation for 2007 is 1.4. Clearly, the data indicates that the
coercing of lodges to subscribe to more electricity in the second phase of distribution
increased the uneven distribution of electricity in Ghandruk at the cost of the Dalits who
contributed equally.
Table 8:
Comparing Distribution in 1991 and 2007
1991

2007

Mean

141

171

Standard Deviation

180

239

Minimum

25

20

Maximum

1000

1400

Count

239

284

Source: Calculations based on current subscription
list and data from Kapali, 1997
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Interestingly, unlike in 1991, when there was a demand for only 33.775 kW,
today demand for electricity in the village has increased substantially as the latest survey
shows that the total demand for additional electricity in the six wards is 71.415 kW (see
figure 7).

According to basic economic principles, something must have changed
tremendously for this surge in demand. The change could have been in the population of
the villages, the income of the villagers, prices of related goods, expectations of villagers,
or the taste and preferences of the villagers. Many in the village believe that the
population of the village, instead of increasing, has decreased over the years as many
people are emigrating abroad and to the cities in search for better opportunities.
Similarly, the income of the villagers could not have been a factor either as there does not
seem to be any sort of economic boom in the village with the recent Maoist insurgency
that lasted for more than ten years. Consequently, the reason why demand for electricity
has increased over the years is because people have now become aware of the widespread
uses and benefits of electricity that they were not during the implementation stage of the
project.

When the villagers where asked why they demanded for so little electricity in
1991, 46% of the interviewees replied that they did so due to unawareness of the
widespread uses of electricity. In addition, 12 % of the respondents pointed out a mixture
of unawareness and income constraints as being the reason. Similarly, 10% of the
respondents stated that the wattage they subscribed to was their best option, 15% stated
that they had financial constraints and 17% of the respondents cited other reasons.
Consequently, when the experts were asked if the locals might have demanded for more
electricity in the first phase had they been better educated about the benefits of electricity
during the implementation stage, all of them agreed. Clearly, the distribution of
electricity would have been more equitable had things been different right from the start.
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Figure 6:
Reasons for Limited Demand in 1991

Source: Field Survey, 2007

Unfortunately, the people that suffered most from this policy error were the poor
and excluded groups (i.e. Dalits) that were least likely to have known about the
widespread benefits and uses of electricity. During the interviews, many locals expressed
that back in 1991 the only electrical appliances they properly knew of were light bulbs:
most didn’t know how electricity could be useful, apart from lighting a bulb on the inside
and outside of the house. In addition, it appears that one of the other deterrents for the
locals was the fear that electricity is something dangerous: electricity can cause short
circuits and shock people to death.

4. DISCUSSION
Donor funded micro hydro projects requiring communal involvement (equal cost
sharing among community members) have come a long way, yet the unequal sharing of
benefit based on an age old discriminatory caste system is unjust. Apart from being
unfair, such practices threat the long run stability of micro hydro plants by brewing
animosity amongst the subalterns. During the field study in Ghandruk, it was found that
talks of an equal redistribution of electricity had been frequently brought up in local
meetings over the past 15 years. Similarly, many of the Dalits that were interviewed
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expressed that they felt exploited and mistreated by the powerful and the system.
Consequently, whilst successfully bringing electricity and the benefits of modernization
to a few local elites, the micro hydro plant has bred immense animosity in the village
between the haves and the have not’s. If the ‘past’ Maoist insurgency and the ongoing
upsurge in the plains of Nepal is anything to go by, one can see how the caste-based
exclusion of the Dalits could mean problem for both the micro hydro plant and the
village. In addition, ensuring more inclusiveness across development projects like
communal micro hydro plants is also in the interest of the nation as a whole.
Developmentalism, since its birth in the mid 20th century with the establishment
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has viewed poverty as a purely
technological problem having nothing to do with messy social sciences such as
economics, politics, and anthropology. The establishment of the Ghandruk micro hydro
plant was an effort in the same direction. From the research findings, we see that the
donor funded development agencies working in Ghandruk were, for the large part,
focused only on the technicalities of establishing a micro hydro plant and were to a large
extent, out of touch with the socio-economic ground realities of the village.
Consequently, the effort proved counterproductive as the micro hydro plant, instead of
bringing wealth and prosperity, exacerbated existent socio-ethnic fragmentation within
the village. If the ‘past’ Maoist insurgency and the ongoing upsurge in the plains of Nepal
is anything to go by, one can see how the current situation in Ghandruk, partly created by
development agencies, can contribute towards further dividing the country. Thus, the key
lesson learned from the analysis is as follows: if donor funded development agencies
truly intend to help the poor; they should, prior to starting development projects
anywhere, gain an adequate understanding of socio-economic ground realities and plan
their projects accordingly. The negative consequence of what happens when this is not
done is evidenced by the case of the Ghandruk micro hydro plant.
5. CONCLUSION
The development of communal micro hydro power is extremely important for the
development of Nepal. In the rugged and unstable regions of rural Nepal where a
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majority of the people still burn fuel wood and kerosene for cooking and lighting,
electrification through micro hydro is the only way out. Nonetheless, if the long run
stability of such micro hydro plants is to be ensured, policy makers and planners should
tackle caste-based exclusion in Nepal’s communal micro hydro plants with the
seriousness it deserves. The three main factors that limit the access of excluded groups
from access to electricity are their financial status, social status, and lack of awareness.
Policy makers should be well aware of these factors and plan accordingly when installing
a new micro hydro plant anywhere. Financially supporting lower caste poorer groups by
charging them less compared to others might be an option in dealing with the financial
barriers that arise. Similarly, creating mechanisms to ensure that the ‘lower’ social status
of excluded groups does not prevent them from asking for and getting the amount of
electricity they deserve is crucial. Finally, it is very important that wherever a communal
micro hydro project goes, villagers are first and foremost educated adequately of the
benefits and uses of electricity.
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